



























Total OFD incurred due to ACP 57.6 19.5 77.1
Total costs due to missing alternate bids 26.8 26.8
MARAD TPEF payment to USAID (34.8) 34.8









Agricultural Cargo Preference (ACP) is a policy requiring that 75 percent of US food
aid commodities be shipped on privately owned, registered US‐flag vessels,
regardless of whether these vessels offer a competitive bid for the service.
According to the Maritime Administration (MARAD), ACP’s primary objectives
include:
One of the require‐ments
for US‐flag status is that
t h ev e s s e lb eo w n e db y
an American company.
Our research indicates
that, while all ACP vessels
are owned by US










ACP aims to support national security by maintaining a fleet of vessels available for
military call‐up. Yet a majority of vessels do not appear to be militarily useful. The
Department of Defense defines militarily useful as container vessels (rather than bulk
or tanker vessels) that are less than 15 years old and provide liner service. Under this
definition,at least 100 of the 142 ACP vessels were not militarilyuseful.
Since 1996 ACP has duplicated the more targeted Maritime Security Program (MSP),
which pays owners of militarily useful vessels $2.9 million/year for what amounts to a
call option on vessels and crews. 47 of the 60 MSP eligible vessels are also ACP
qualified, although only 25 of them carried USAID food aid cargo in FY2006. Less than
7% of ACP expenditures supported MSP vessels.
Box 3: National Security Contributions
ACP helps employ US citizen mariners. Exact employment figures are elusive, but
best estimates indicate that each mariner position costs taxpayers $99,342. In the
half century since ACP was first enacted, there has been no documented call‐up of
civilian mariners from ACP vessels for nationalsecurity purposes.
Increase competition by relaxing or removing entirely MSA‐17 restrictions on Great Lakes shipments. This will
allow for greater price‐based competition among ocean carriers.
Address national security concerns through direct subsidies to militarily useful vessels and mariners via the
existing DoD/MARAD MSP program. Additionally, ACP eligibility could be restricted to vessels that are clearly
militarilyuseful, thereby eliminating costly support for older, more expensive vessels.
American companies, mariners and other shipping industry employment will benefit from more stringent
guidelines regarding corporate parentage of eligible carriers.
Box 2:  Costs of Cargo Preference
USAID adherence to ACP policy in FY2006 cost taxpayers a total of $104 million. This represents a 46%
markup over competitive freight costs. The division of these costs between the Maritime Administration
(MARAD) and food aid agencies is the source of some contention. A complex system of subsidies and
reimbursements divides FY2006 costs between the agencies as indicated in the table below.
Multiple agencies with divergent interests are involved in the administration of
ACP. MARAD primarily represents ocean carriers and actively enforces compliance
with ACP rules. The food aid agencies, USDA and USAID, often find ACP
compliance a costly burden related to their primary goal of effective provision of
international food aid. Until now, there has been very little empirical analysis of
thecosts of ACP and its effectiveness in advancing its stated goals.
Perhaps the most anti‐competitive influence is an obscure policy from the Maritime
Security Act of 1996 known as MSA‐17, which requires that 25% of all bagged food aid
cargo pass through Great Lakes ports and exempts this 25% from the ACP requirement
of shipment on US‐flag vessels. As a result, MSA‐17 absorbs the maximum 25 percent
foreign‐flag shipment allowable under ACP, effectively limiting shipments from all other
ports to US‐flag vessels. This drives up costs by eliminating competition and reducing
flexibilitywithin USAID and USDA’s procurement processes.
A.P. Moller‐Maersk indirectly owns at least 21 of the 144 ACP vessels through
subsidiaries Maersk Lines, Ltd. and Maersk Sealand. Meanwhile Neptune Orient Lines,
of Singapore owns 10 vessels through its subsidiary American President Lines. Almost
40% of the tonnage we could identify conclusively with a corporate parent was hauled
on vessels ultimately owned by a foreign corporation.












To estimate the costs of ACP, we analyzed transactions‐level data on all 1,741 bulk and
bagged food aid shipments by USAID during fiscal year 2006. These data include detailed
information on each individual shipment, including commodity, tonnage, vessel name and
flag status, ocean freight costs, and the presence or absence of alternate bids for the
shipment. Our computations were guided by a 1987 Memorandum of Understanding




T h ec o r ep r o b l e mw i t hA g r i c u l t u r a l
Cargo Preference is the difficulty
inherent to pursuing multiple policy
objectives through a single policy
instrument. Therefore, our primary
recommendation is to untangle
ACP policy objectives and address
them one by one.
The above costs combined with an estimate of the USDA costs amount to a total estimated cost of $140
million spent on adherence to ACP regulations in FY2006. This is nearly equivalent to the value of all Title II
non‐emergency food aid programs in Africa for FY2006 ($143 million).
The Ocean Freight Differential is
t h ed i f f e r e n c ei nc o s tb e t w e e n
the winning US‐flag bid and a
competing foreign‐flag bid for a
given shipment. OFD costs are
the basis for determining the
costs of ACP and calculating
reimbursements by MARAD to
USAID and USDA.
FY2006: All ACP‐Related Costs and Payments  ($ millions)
The Twenty Percent Excess Freight
provision requires a transfer of funds
from MARAD to USAID and USDA when
the cost of shipping exceeds 20 percent
of the valueof the commodities shipped.
For those shipments not receiving a
foreign‐flag bid, OFD cannot be calculated
and therefore the costs of ACP are difficult
to ascertain. We applied an average per‐
t o nc o s to fs h i p m e n to naU S ‐flag vessel to
these shipments in order to estimate the
additionalcosts to USAID
MARAD is required to reimburse USAID
and USDA for one third of OFD costs
associated with vessels 24 years old and
younger. This has significant implic‐
ations, given the aging of the US‐flag
fleet and significant cost differentials
associated with shipment on older
vessels.
PERCENT OF TONNAGE
Bagged Bulk
FOREIGN‐
FLAG
Percent foreign‐flag 
winning bids
MSA‐17:
24.4%
22%
Non‐MSA‐17:
0.4%
US‐FLAG
Competitive ocean rate 9.6% 0.2%
Non‐competitive ocean rate 46.6% 52%
Missing foreign‐flag bid
MSA‐17:
0.2%
25%
Non‐MSA‐17:
18.8%
TOTAL 100% 100%
FY2006:  USAID Food Aid Tonnage Allocated to U.S. and Foreign‐Flagged Vessels
There are significant differences in competitiveness between subsectors of the US‐flag 
fleet.  While US‐flag ocean carriers very rarely offer competitive rates, virtually none 
(0.2%) of the bulk vessels did, while almost 10% of the containerships carrying bagged 
food aid offered competitive bids.
P&0 Nedlloyd
Chesapeake Bay
Ownership structure for A.P. Møller‐MaerskGroup‐owned ACP Vessels
A.P. Møller‐Maersk
(Denmark)
Maersk Sealand
(US subsidiary)
MaerskArizona, 
MaerskCarolina, 
MaerskGeorgia, 
MaerskMissouri, 
MaerskVirginia
Maersk Lines, Ltd
(US subsidiary)
Farrell Lines, Inc